Th is paper explores the relationships between openness, poverty and inequality in Africa. Th e analysis begins with a review of social development on the continent since 1980, followed by a discussion of openness and a lengthy exploration of the patterns of trade and fi nance that link Africa to the rest of the world. Th e macroeconomic policy framework that guided African policymaking over the last three decades is the lens through which poverty and inequality are further examined. Th e paper highlights the major factors underpinning openness and social development, and concludes with policy.
Openness, Inequality and Poverty in Africa
Alemayehu Geda 1 For Africa, it is not yet clear if globalisation, defi ned as increased openness to trade and fi nancial fl ows, will improve social development and equity or lead to rising inequality and poverty on the continent. Th is paper contributes to this discourse by exploring the relationships between openness, poverty and inequality in Africa. Th e analysis begins with a review of social development over the last two decades of the twentieth century and details the progress various African countries and regions have made toward attaining a spectrum of policy goals. Th is section is followed by a discussion of openness and a lengthy exploration of the patterns of trade and fi nance, since these are the main channels linking Africa to the rest of the world. Th e macroeconomic policy framework that guided African policymaking over the last three decades is the lens through which poverty and inequality are further examined. Th e paper highlights the major factors underpinning openness and social development, and concludes with policy recommendations that may help abate destitution and inequity.
Social progress in Africa in the 1990s
2 Improving health, education, employment, and equality have been long-term, as well as recent United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Africa. Over the past few decades, the lessons learned, statistics, and data that have accrued now inform the debate on social development policy.
Comparative data from the 1990s show that human development is highly correlated with the status of and access to education and healthcare (see Table 1 ). Table 1 also confi rms a decline in illiteracy rates by nearly half since 1990. Gender disparity however, remained largely unchanged. Encouraging results were also recorded for gross enrolment ratios and infant mortality rates, in which North Africa, followed by Eastern and then Southern Africa, showed relatively improved performance.
Except for Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles, poverty appears pervasive in the Eastern and Southern African sub-regions (ESA), where an estimated 50 per cent live below the poverty line. In the Central and West African (CWA) sub-region, the dire economic situation severely aff ects the most disadvantaged segments of society, particularly in rural areas. Poverty incidence is lower in North Africa (NA), where approximately 22 per cent of the population live below the poverty line.
Th ough most African nations deplored the negative impact of structural adjustment programs on the poor, these countries appear to have accepted structural reforms as necessary for and indispensable to sustainable growth. Such reforms were meant to incorporate poverty reduction strategies as a central element of a long-term economic development vision. Th is was to be accomplished by allocating resources to sectors that would have the greatest impact on poverty reduction. A number of countries increased their budget-ary allocations to the education and health sectors, and accordingly, have reported tangible progress. For instance, gross enrolment rates at the primary level have increased while gender gaps somewhat narrowed (see Table 1 ). Other countries moved forward by focusing on the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the mitigation of high maternal mortality rates and the major childhood diseases responsible for high infant and under-fi ve (U5MR) mortality rates (see Table 1 ). Some countries have achieved almost universal access to basic health services. Finally, all countries in the sub-regions have taken steps to bolster employment, especially for vulnerable groups, though unemployment rates in urban areas remain disproportionately high.
In addition, good governance has also been identifi ed as a pre-requisite for socio-political and economic development. Almost all countries have reported signifi cant improvements in governance structures and modalities in working towards peace, stability and security. Th is is complemented by forums such as NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development), which addresses governance through various means, including a peer-review mechanism among African leaders.
Given the pervasiveness of poverty and social under-development in Africa, these improvements are inadequate. It is therefore relevant to ask whether there are special features specifi c to Africa that can help explain the massive poverty and inequality that engulf the continent. Some of the elements that may help explicate Africa's severe under-development include; (1) weak initial conditions (such as ailing institutions and human capital, and an extractive and lingering colonial history) at the time of independence; (2) the dependence of almost all African countries on primary commodity production and trade; (3) the lack of non-aid fi nancial capital and the alarming level of aid-dependency; (4) the lack of ownership of policies that are invariably imposed on Africa by donors; and (5) the prevalence of confl ict and poor governance. Th e rest of this study is devoted to an in-depth examination of these issues in the context of globalisation.
Recent patterns of openness, inequality and poverty in Africa
Recent literature has emphasized the theory that trade policy strongly impacts growth. Dollar (1992) , BenDavid (1993) , Sachs and Warner (1995) , and Frankel and Romer (1999) , using diff erent measures of openness, noted that openness is signifi cantly and positively associated with economic growth. Th is assertion however, is not without its critics (see below, for instance, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) . Dixit (1988) and Calvo (1987 Calvo ( , 1988 have also contested the conclusions of the afro-mentioned studies (Collier and Gunning, 1996 ).
Rodrik's various works questioned the uncritical acceptance of the importance of openness (see Rodrik, 1992 Rodrik, , 1999 Rodrik, , 2001 . He debated whether the measures of openness used in the infl uential articles cited above focused solely on trade policy issues. In Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) , the authors made it abundantly clear that the openness measures used in much of the empirical literature did not really select trade policy indicators as such. Th erefore, the fi nding that openness matters for growth could be spurious. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) , after critically examining the main fi nding of these infl uential proopenness studies, noted that this literature is largely uninformative regarding the question of "do countries with lower policy-induced barriers to international trade grow faster once other relevant country characteristics are controlled for?" Th ey noted that there is a signifi cant gap between the message that the consumers of this literature (including multilateral institutions) have derived from it and the 'facts' that the literature actually demonstrates. Th is gap emerged from; (1) the researchers use of 'openness' indicators that serve as poor measures of trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources of bad economic performance; and (2) the methods or empirical strategies used to ascertain the link between trade policy and growth; these methods have serious shortcomings, and their removal results in signifi cantly weaker fi ndings.
Th e main point made by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) is that some of the commonly used openness indicators serve as a proxy for a wide range of policy and institutional diff erences, and they can give biased results that do not properly evaluate the eff ect of trade policies on growth. Th e authors however, were in no way suggesting pursuing trade restrictions. Th ey underscored that, "what we would like the readers to take away from this paper is some caution and humility in interpreting the existing cross-national evidence on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth" (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000: 62) . For instance, in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, as noted in Rodrik (1998) , there is little concern that Africa's diff erent conditions such as poor infrastructure, geography or dependence on few commodities, make it a special case where exports do not respond to liberalization policies. However, he argues, the eff ect of trade policy on economic growth seem to be indirect and much more modest. Th is is because the fundamentals for long-term growth, including human resources, physical infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and the rule of law, are relatively underdeveloped on the continent (Rodrik, 1998) .
Th ese studies draw attention to the diffi culty of defi ning openness with reasonable indicators (see Fosu, 2000 for a discussion). Various measures are used, including exchange rate overvaluation, relative price distortions, tariff s and quotas, share of trade in gross domestic product (GDP), and the parallel market pre-miums rate. According to Fosu's survey, the most comprehensive measure of openness appears to be the one used by Sachs and Warner (1995). 3 Although data limits us from computing a comprehensive measure of openness for Africa, the data given in Table 2 and Figure 1 are instructive. Table 2 shows that exports and imports account for about 60 per cent of Africa's GDP (equally divided between exports and imports). Africa's fi nancial integration in the world economy is limited, as can be ascertained from the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in GDP, which is about one per cent in the last decade. Th e share of aid however, (and hence debt creating fl ows) in the total budget of most African countries is signifi cant (see below). Since the share of government subsidies in total public spending amounts to only 3.5 per cent on average, we could infer that Africa is generally noninterventionist. Similarly, the share of tax revenue on international trade is approximately 12 per cent of total government revenue (see Table 2 ). Overall, Figure 1 off ers an elaborated version of the openness indicator, together with the average growth of the economy, for each country during the period 1990-2001. It shows a positive correlation between openness and growth (with a correlation coeffi cient of about 0.30). Table 3 shows the deceleration of growth in the volume of exports in SSA from about 15 per cent per annum in the early days of independence to about 3 per cent today. Th e current level of growth is far below the average for other parts of the world. Th e share of sub-Saharan Africa in total world export values has also steadily declined by more than half during the period of 1980 to 2001 (see Table 3 ).
African Openness: Th e pattern of trade
Th e structure of African exports is characterized by dependence on primary commodities, which makes them vulnerable to global economic shocks. Such commodities are also characterized by low income elasticity of demand, volatility, and a secular decline in prices. Th ey also generally represent sectors where the scope for technical progress is limited (see, among others, Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Alemayehu, 2002) (see Figures 2 and 3, and Annex 1a).
For many African countries, more than 50 per cent of export earnings derive from only three principal primary commodities (see Table 5a , b and Figure 3 ). For most small mineral exporting countries this fi gure increases to over 80 per cent. SSA as a whole depends on three major commodities for about 70 per cent of its total export receipts (see Annex 1b and Figure 3 ). Only 8 out of 43 countries (Djibouti, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Sierra Leon, Sudan, and Swaziland) have a relatively diversifi ed export structure. Such a narrow export base combined with weak domestic capacity results in an export supply response less than that of import demand response. In the context of trade liberalization in Africa, the overall result was a deterioration in the balance of trade (see UNCTAD, 2004 ).
In addition, African countries are also highly dependent on a few developed countries as destinations for their exports (see Table 6 ). For the period 1955-2002, these developed countries received on average, 80 per cent of Africa's exports. Th is trend, however, has been declining over the last four decades. Europe stands out as the dominant trading partner, with an average share of about 60 per cent. Although the share of African trade in the world is limited, what happens globally, and in particular in the developed countries, has an enormous impact on Africa (see Alemayehu, 2002) . Table 3 . 1965-1973 1973-1980 1980-1986 1993-2002 Industrial Th e negative impacts of dependence on primary commodity exports are refl ected in three interdependent phenomena: a decline in terms of trade, instability of export earnings, and an absolute decline in the levels of demand and supply (see Tables 5a and 5b ). Table 5a demonstrates that Africa suff ers from export price instability, while Table 5b details the secular decline in its terms of trade (though there was some improvement in recent years). Table 6 shows the concentration of African exports in a few developed countries, which was 84 per cent in 1955 and 71 per cent in 2000. Th e data also reveal a shift from the EU to the US, which is becoming a more frequent destination for African exports. 1962-1980 1982-1990 1991-1994 1998-2001 1977-2001 All 1962-1980 1982-1990 1991-1994 1998-2001* 1977-2001 Africa's share of world FDI is extremely low. In general, by the second half of the 1990s, the average share of FDI in GDP was not only very small but also declining. Any positive trends were largely related to investment in countries with newly discovered resources. For instance in 1996, FDI was a mere US$5.5 billion, representing only 1.5 per cent of global investment fl ows. Its distribution was also extremely skewed, with Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire accounting for over 67 per cent of FDI receipts to Africa. Between 1991 and 1996 ten countries (Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia) received almost 90 per cent of fl ows, with Nigeria alone absorbing a third. Th e majority of fl ows emanated from France, UK, Germany, and the US. Favoured recipient sectors included oil, gas, metals and other extractive industries (ADB, 1998).
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Recently, however, there has been a surge of FDI to some countries (Kasekende, Kitabire and Martin, 1996; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Bhinda and others, 1999) . For all of Africa, the share of FDI in GDP rose from 0.29 per cent (US$1.3 billion) in 1990 to 0.56 per cent (US$2.7 billion) in 1995 and to 1.2 per cent (US$6.3 billion) in 1998. Th e comparable fi gures for SSA during this period, excluding South Africa, were 0.41 per cent (US$0.76 billion), 1.61 per cent (US$2.7 billion) and 2.4 per cent (US$4.8 billion) respectively.
Relative market size, the existence of mining activity, and the historical pattern of investment together determine the fl ow of FDI to Africa (see Alemayehu, 2002) . Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma (1997) grouped African FDI recipients into three categories; (1) countries that are long-term recipients (Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zambia); (2) countries that recorded large increases in the 1990s (Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigerian and Zimbabwe); and (3) countries that have low and/or declining levels of FDI, but with encouraging turnaround, such as Uganda.
Other private capital fl ows such as portfolio fl ows, bank fl ows and bonds also refl ect the openness of African economies. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, private capital fl ows (described as FDI, private equity fl ows and private loans, which included bank, bond and other fl ows) to SSA were about 9 per cent of total private fl ows to developing countries. Th is declined to 1.6 per cent during the period of 1990-1995. Th is sharp fall was attributed chiefl y to the rapid deceleration of private loans beginning in the mid-1980s (Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma, 1997) .
Based on a case study of South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, Bhinda and others (1999) recently noted, however, that this trend and perception are changing. South Africa has received higher fl ows than all four countries combined (90 per cent of total SSA since 1992) in absolute terms. However, relative to GDP, the other countries have received levels ranging from 10 to 15 per cent, (except South Africa, which received 4 per cent). Th ese percentages are as high as the fastest growing Southeast Asian and Latin American countries (Bhinda and others, 1999) .
Portfolio equity fl ows, though insignifi cant in magnitude (except in South Africa), are also growing. From 1994 to 1997, more than 12 African-oriented funds have been set up with a total of more than US$1 billion. Th e operation of these funds is expanding beyond their initial focus on South Africa to Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma, 1997) . Recent information shows three important equity funds with SSA exposure; (1) Pan-African funds with an exposure of US$692.9 million; (2) South African dedicated funds with an exposure of US$8.057 billion; and (3) Emerging market global funds with an exposure of US$1.5 to $3.5 billion (4 to 10 per cent of world total is in SSA). Total SSA portfolio investment stock rose to US$10.3-12.3 billion around 1995 (see Bhinda and others, 1999 ).
Bank fl ows to Africa are not that important, except in South Africa, and to some degree, in Tanzania. Th is is partly attributed to lenders' preferences to change exposure following economic trends such as; the rapid increase of foreign exchange holdings in Africa following fi nancial sector liberalization; domestic fi nancial sector problems like debt overhang and domestic payment arrears; and the perception of high country risk. Together these factors resulted either in the decline or increasingly very short-term nature of bank fl ows. Whenever such fl ows are growing, they are invariably associated with foreign banks. Finally, bond fl ows are not only low, but also erratic, a phenomenon partly attributed to the low credit rating of most African countries in global fi nancial markets (see Bhinda and others, 1999) .
Empirical studies reveal a variety of factors behind the recent surge in portfolio fl ows. Equity fl ows, followed by bonds, which in the African context take the form of treasury bills, are noted as the most important. Th ese factors can be grouped into:
Global or push factors; the trend in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to invest in emerging markets and the problems some of the OECD institutional (usually pension) investors faced with low interest rates and a slow down in economic activity at home. Such investors fi nd SSA attractive because its yields have a low correlation with other emerging markets. Perception of SSA by investors; perceptions are largely determined by investors' information about Africa and range from a very positive 'fi nal frontier' view to a negative bias. National factors; these include political and macroeconomic stability, good governance, economic growth, regional integration, standardized regional structure of banks, developed and positively performing stock markets, and the existence of a motivated labour force. Particularly, with non-equity fl ows (bonds and treasury bills); the liberalization of economies, possibility of holding dollar denominated accounts in local banks and hence the low risk nature of such fl ows, good credit ratings, high domestic interest rates and the development of capital
• markets are important (see also Bhinda and others, 1999: 69-84; Alemayehu, 2002; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Reinhart, 1993, 1996) .
Openness also means that Africans now have a choice, legal or illegal, to hold their assets in advanced countries--also known as capital fl ight. Notwithstanding the measurement problems associated with capital fl ight, a study using a rather large data set based on 22 countries from sub-Saharan Africa concluded that the continent has the highest incidence, exceeding even the Middle East. Th irty-nine per cent of private portfolios were held outside the continent. Were Africa able to attract back this component of private wealth, the private capital stock would increase by approximately 64 per cent (Collier, Hoeffl er and Pattillo, 1999) . Similarly, Ajayi's (1997) estimate of capital fl ight from severely indebted low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa, which stood at US$22 billion, constituted nearly half of the external resource requirement to reduce poverty by half estimated by Amoako and Ali (1998 A review of the empirical literature reveals that the high level of capital fl ight from Africa, despite the continent's capital scarce characteristics, is attributable to overvalued exchange rates, its evaluation by international investors as the riskiest continent, and the level of indebtedness of African countries (Collier, Hoeffl er and Pattillo, 1999; Hermes and Lensink, 1992) . Th e impact of debt on capital fl ight is, however, contested in Ajayi (1997) and Alemayehu (2002) who found no relationship between the two variables. Ajayi (1997) and Collier, Hoeffl er and Pattillo (1999) also pointed to the importance of 'trade-faking' (over and under invoicing of imports and exports), political instability (including the abuse of power), unfavourable macroeconomic environments, and the lack of economic growth as factors triggering capital fl ight (see Ajayi, 1997) .
Bilateral and multilateral fl ows and Africa's external debt problem
Th e total external debt of Africa has increased nearly twenty-fi ve fold from a relatively low level of US$14 billion in 1971, to more than US$300 billion in 2003. Th e major component is outstanding long-term debt, (bilateral fl ows followed by multilateral) which is generally obtained on concessional terms. Over time, International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits were also increasingly used, along with 'Structural Adjustment' and 'Enhanced Structural Adjustment' facilities until they became a large component of debt. Th e accumulation of arrears from these fl ows is leading to an amassing of debt and its attendant problems. Th e latter is aggravated by the capitalization of interest and principal arrears, which constitute nearly a quarter of the external debt burden of the continent (Alemayehu, 2003) .
Although the share of African debt as a proportion of the total debt of developing countries is low, the relative debt burden born by Africa is extremely heavy compared to its capacity, and in particular to its exports. If we exclude grants and net FDI from total infl ows to Africa, net transfers since 1990 have, in fact, been negative, with net outfl ows actually rising from Africa to the developed nations. Such fl ows increased from US$3.6 billion in 1985 to nearly US$12.5 billion in 1998. Finally, in the 1990s, nearly 35 per cent of grants to Africa went to 'technical experts' that usually came from donor countries.
Th e actual size of indebtedness does not typically represent an economic problem in itself, since such debt can usually be mitigated by rescheduling and similar short-term arrangements. However, the size of accumulated debt relative to capacity and its subsequent impact on the economy represent a serious dilemma for African countries. In this respect, three inter-related implications of the debt issue deserve mention. First, servicing of the external debt erodes foreign exchange reserves, which might otherwise be available for the purchase of imports. In the past, this led to the 'import compression problem', which is when a shortage of foreign exchange adversely aff ected levels of public and private sector investment and ultimately, growth and poverty reduction (see, for instance, Ndulu, 1986 Ndulu, , 1991 Ratso, 1994) . Second, the accumulation of a debt stock results in a 'debt overhang' problem, which tends to undermine the confi dence of private investors, both foreign and domestic. A decline in levels of private investment as a share of GDP from the late 1970s onward may be in part, attributed to this factor (see, for instance, Elbadawi, Ndulu and Ndung'u, 1997) . Finally, debt servicing places enormous fi scal pressure on many African nations. Th is may explain, to some extent, the high fi scal defi cits and decline in the share of public investment in GDP since the late 1970s. Naturally, a reduction in public investment will tend to have adverse consequences for physical and social infrastructure, which are vital for social development. Th is outcome is signifi cant given that public sector investments, in particular in the low income countries of Africa, crowd-in private investment (see Alemayehu, 2002 Alemayehu, , 2003 .
Th e performance of African economies, coupled with a mounting debt burden, surely indicates that African countries are incapable of simultaneously servicing their debt and attaining a reasonable level of economic growth, let alone addressing the issues of poverty alleviation and social development. Th e 1996 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is not only besieged by much conditionality, but also fails to off er a sustainable solution to Africa's fi nancial and trade problems (see Alemayehu, 2003) .
Has globalisation caused inequality and poverty in Africa?
Trade liberalization and Inequality in Africa
Th e earlier literature written by Africans took extreme openness as one of the major obstacles hindering development.
4 ECA (1989) noted that weaknesses in Africa's productive base, the predominant subsistence and exchange nature of the economy, and its openness (to international trade and fi nance) have all conspired to perpetuate the external dependence of the continent. According to this report, the dominance of the external sector is a striking feature of the African economy, and one that leaves African countries quite vulnerable to exogenous shocks (ECA, 1989) . Other Analysts (see Collier and Gunning, 1999) , however, argue that "lack of openness explains why Africa has grown more slowly than other regions."
Although global interdependence takes the form of both fi nance and trade, the focus here is on trade liberalization because of Africa's under-developed fi nancial sector and its relative isolation (apart from aid) from global fi nancial markets. 5 Africa's trade, though very small from the rest of the world's point view (SSA share in world exports is about 1 per cent), is dominant and vital, from the African perspective. Trade share in each country's GDP averages about 80 per cent. Th e empirical literature identifi es various channels through which trade liberalization has impacted Africa, including levels and composition of investment, household welfare, the distribution of income, and the competitiveness of local fi rms.
One of the avenues through which trade liberalization can aff ect growth and poverty is through investment. Collier and Gunning (1996) noted that the literature does not unequivocally concur that trade liberalization positively aff ects aggregate investment. Buffi e (1992) argued that if the protected imports substitutes sector is capital intensive then trade liberalization will reduce the returns on investment. In this view, liberalization is tantamount to a reduction of subsidies on capital goods. Collier and Gunning (1996) , based on the case of Uganda, Nigeria, and Tanzania, suggested that trade liberalization might result not only in a fall in aggregate investment, but also in changes in its composition. Dividing investment into equipment (tradable capital) and structure (non-tradable capital), they found that in each country, equipment investment fell signifi cantly both in absolute and relative (to GDP) terms. For instance, in Uganda, equipment investment fell by 20 per cent while structures investment rose by 34 per cent. Th e authors underscored the need to weigh these opposing changes to analyse the eff ects of trade liberalization on investment and its composition. If the traded sector is characterized by dynamic externalities and learning by doing, as is usually the case, the detrimental eff ect of liberalization on Africa's growth could be very large. Changes in investment might also be related to the terms of trade. Liberalization in Africa has led to specialization in commodity production, which has been characterized by deterioration in the terms of trade (see Alemayehu, 2002) . Along the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, this volatility in the terms of trade brought about capital (and hence, investment) instability in Africa (see Fosu, 1991) .
Another area of concern for African countries is the eff ect of liberalization on household welfare. UNCTAD (2004) shows that there is a general tendency for the incidence of extreme poverty to be more persistent in commodity dependent countries, such as those in Africa. In least developing countries that export minerals, the incidence of $1/day poverty rose on average from 61 to 82 per cent between the period 1981 -1983 (UNCTAD, 2004 . Haouas and Yagoubi (2003) investigated the response of demand elasticities for labour to trade liberalization in Tunisian manufacturing industries. Th ey found weak empirical support for the claim that trade liberalization leads to an increase in the demand elasticity for labour, and they attributed this to the tight labour regulation in Tunisia. Th is fi nding indicates the possibility of mitigating the detrimental eff ect of liberalization on welfare, but only at the cost of fi rm effi ciency and competitiveness.
Another study on Tunisia by Chemingui and Th abet (2001), using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, found that liberalization, and specifi cally the reduction of export subsidies in the agricultural sector, decreased average rural household welfare. Th e study attributed this result to a shift in domestic demand from locally produced goods to imported goods, and to a shift in supply from production for local markets to production for foreign markets. Th e elimination of internal support (subsidies) for agricultural sectors made agricultural inputs expensive. Th is rise in price forced suppliers to allocate resources for production that used less of the previously subsidized inputs. Th e authors found that rural households will bear the harsher consequences of these changes as both their income and expenditure are negatively aff ected.
Th e impacts of trade liberalization on urban households have also been the subject of much debate. For instance, Litchfi eld, McCulloch and Winters (2003) found that trade liberalization hurt non-agricultural households, while the combination of output and input market reforms dampened the eff ect on rural farmers. Th e idea that urban households will be aff ected, but only through a change in their level of expenditure, appears to contradict the study of Bussolo and Lecomte (1999) . Th ey demonstrated that in sub-Saharan Africa, a reduction of average tariff s from 40 per cent to 10 per cent entails a real income loss of 35 per cent for urban employers and 41 per cent for recipients of trade rents, compared to a gain of 20 per cent for farmers. Th e overall net gain for the economy is estimated at 2.5 per cent. As noted by Chemingui and Th abet (2001), the relatively small size of this effi ciency gain, compared to the redistribution eff ects, makes trade liberalization diffi cult for policy makers to pursue.
In a similar vein, Blake, McKay and Morrissey (2000) concluded that trade liberalization has modest positive welfare eff ects. 6 Th ey noted that the welfare of agricultural producers has signifi cantly improved, although the urban self-employed stood to gain more from freer trade. Ingco (1996) using data from a sample of developing countries, including those from Africa, noted that trade liberalization in agriculture has invariably led to a terms of trade deterioration. Th is result can be counteracted however, with reforms that correct for domestic distortions. Th e terms of trade gain and loss is mixed for most African countries in his sample. For net beverage exporters, however, Ingco (1996) reported a loss in terms of trade. He also observed that welfare losses are associated with the extent of initial trade distortion. Th e larger this distortion, the greater the welfare loss will be. Given the distortions in many African countries, welfare losses following liberalization are likely to be the dominant eff ect.
A number of negative impacts of trade liberalization on household welfare are documented in the review of Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2002) . In the case of Zambia, trade liberalization distorted domestic marketing arrangements and eventually destroyed markets. For instance, the maize marketing monopsony that benefi ted rural households by allowing them to purchase large stocks of maize was abolished. Th e loss of the monopsony isolated rural households and signifi cantly reduced their income (Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) . Deininger, Klaus and Olinto (2000, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) , using micro-panel data for farm households in Zambia, found that the improvement of agricultural productivity following external liberalization was severely constrained by the absence of key productive assets. Related studies cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2002) and Head (1998) showed that female workers in South Africa suff ered a great deal when the EU scaled back its imports of canned fruit. Elson and Evers (1997) noted that some studies showed that fi shermen in Tanzania shared the same fate when the EU cut back its imports of fi sh over the period 1997-1998. Fishermen incomes declined by a sizable 80 per cent. Elson and Evers (1997, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) observed that in a response to commercialised agriculture, many households in Uganda shifted from the production of food crops to cash crops, jeopardizing family health in the process. Th eir study shows that the adjustments elicited a positive supply response, but at the same time, increased demands on female labour time, and this was accompanied by increases in child malnutrition.
Th ere are however, studies that point to gains in household welfare. Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly (1998, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) showed that an additional dollar of new farm income raises total household income by $2.88 in Burkina Faso, $1.96 in Niger, $2.48 in the Central Groundnut Basin of Senegal and $2.57 in Zambia. Th ese increases in household incomes, Hazel and Hojjati (1995, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) argue, are due to the high marginal propensities to consume out of local non-tradable goods. Furthermore, Löfgren (1999, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) , made the case that reduced agricultural protection in Morocco was bound to have substantial welfare gains in aggregate terms. Similarly, Anderson and Yao (2003) demonstrated that the welfare gains accruing to SSA region from participating in the World Trade Organization (WTO) rounds are twice as much than from not partaking in it.
Using data for 14 countries, Hertel and others (2002) concluded that the impact of trade liberalization on diff erent households can't be conclusively determined because the eff ects were fairly varied and not always positive. It was also observed that global trade liberalization had the unwelcome eff ect of raising the price of staple foods relative to non-food prices. Since the poor spend a disproportionate share of their in-come on food, trade liberalization will adversely impact them. Moreover, the impacts on short-run earnings are fairly mixed. With agricultural profi ts rising and non-agricultural profi ts and wages falling, the overall outcome depends on the structure of poverty in each country. Th ese results are also reproduced in Hertel and others (2002) .
Th e loss in terms of welfare for Africa may also come, as noted by Dembele (2001) , from the global unfairness of trade liberalization. Th ough most developing countries reduced import tariff s to less than 20 per cent and removed non-tariff barriers altogether, developed countries have not implemented their same commitments. Th is unevenness in liberalization has caused cheap imports (including from newly industrializing Asian countries) to fl ood sub-Saharan African markets. Th is has resulted in the destabilization of many small scale private and public enterprises, and the subsequent loss of a considerable volume of domestic jobs. Th is trend of de-industrialization, as noted by Dembele (2001) , has been accompanied by the repealing of minimum wage laws, which, although aimed at helping competitiveness, have severely reduced the bargaining power of employees. Currency devaluations and loss of revenue from import taxes have diminished purchasing power, with governments forced to respond to budget defi cits with new indirect taxes. Th e result is more pressure on low income families that tend to spend most of their income on consumption, and cutbacks on important public, especially social, spending.
Tekere (2001) similarly reported that liberalization in Zimbabwe put the country's economy in turmoil, and that growth was better in the years preceding it. According to Lall (1999, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) , the increased import competition in Africa has substantially reduced industrial employment. Rather than upgrading aggressively, fi rms in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania contracted their activity in response to competitive pressure. Lall (1999) noted that fi rms' lack of preparedness for competition, the absence of policies to promote technological improvement, and the poor technological and infrastructure development in the countries were thought to have contributed signifi cantly to these perverse results. A similar study by Parker, Riopelle and Steel (1995, cited in Winters, McCulloch and McKay, 2002) showed that the benefi ts from import-liberalization accrued mainly to fi rms that modifi ed their operations swiftly. Rodrik (1992) noted that the impetus for liberalization in Latin American and African countries primarily arose from the prolonged macro-economic quagmire in which developing countries were immersed during the 1980s. Th e liberalization hence pursued has generally led to fi ve dollars of income being reshuffl ed within the economy for every dollar of effi ciency gain. Th is huge distributional eff ect has an enormous political implication. Considering three parties, consumers, domestic producers and import license holders, he showed that license holders and domestic producers lost portions of income while consumers gained by a magnitude that barely exceeded these losses. Th is left a net effi ciency gain that amounted to a fraction of the losses of the two parties (i.e. the ratio of net gains to redistribution that is involved is very small). Although there are studies that support the view that trade reform improves equity, the prospect of too much redistribution may explain the political diffi culty in enacting trade reform. From the perspective of policymakers, the study elaborates that the pure reshuffl ing of income must be counted as a political cost. Th e rents and revenues that accrue on a regular basis create entitlements, thereby increasing the political diffi culty of instituting changes except, perhaps in times of crisis. It is thus instructive and important to appreciate the political context of such reform, particularly in Africa where the democratic tradition is generally nascent.
In summary, the existing empirical literature on Africa shows that the impact of trade liberalization on household welfare is mixed. In most cases rural households, relative to urban, seem to benefi t during the initial stages of reform. On the other hand, liberalization changes the level and composition of investment, and causes large redistributions in income that are politically costly and associated with de-industrialization. Which of these eff ects dominate in a particular country is largely an empirical question. In countries that are non-oil primary commodity exporters, trade liberalization is associated with poverty and thought to reinforce the poverty trap. In general, UNCTAD (2004) reported that, the trade-poverty relationship improved between the fi rst and the second half of the 1990s. Using the IMF index that categorizes countries as open, moderately open, and restricted, the study found that moderately open countries, followed by the restricted ones, made the greatest improvements (UNCTAD, 2004) .
Trade Liberalization and Poverty in Africa
Poverty is pervasive in Africa. As Table 7 demonstrates, North Africa has a relatively lower incidence of poverty when compared to Southern and East-Africa, which have the highest. Poverty is also found to be largely a rural phenomenon, and in most countries, urban is lower than rural destitution by as much as 50 per cent, suggesting signifi cant regional disparities in the standards of living. During the 1990s, the number of poor living in SSA increased by about 73 million, leading to a one percentage point rise in the incidence of poverty (see Table 8 ). ECA (2003) noted that close to half of the African population lives on less than a dollar per day. However, a comparison of two surveys conducted for about 14 countries in the early and late 1990s shows that there may be a trend towards poverty reduction (see Tables 7 and 9 ).
Human development indicators remained fundamentally unchanged in the 1990s, though there were still a number of cases where poverty showed signifi cant improvement. Th ese included Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Lesotho, South Africa, Egypt and Uganda, where absolute poverty noticeably declined (see Tables 8 and 9 ). Other reports also indicated signifi cant improvements in the condition of the poor in Mozambique and Rwanda. Despite these encouraging signs, poverty in Africa, particularly in SSA remains deeply entrenched.
ECA (2003) illustrated the spatial dimension of poverty when it reported that poor households tended to be in the most impoverished regions. Th ese households were also likely to be larger in size, less literate, and suff ering from insuffi cient nutrition. ECA also approximated that a quarter of the people in many African countries are chronically poor, with up to 60 per cent of the population transitioning in and out of poverty. Th eir fi ndings underscored the importance of reducing vulnerability as an anti-poverty strategy (ECA, 2003) .
Th e economic growth that stems from international trade is one eff ective means available to Africans for tackling poverty. It is therefore important to ask whether poverty in Africa is associated with greater openness in general, and trade liberalization in particular. Th e available aggregate data for Africa is presented in Figure 4 , where openness (measured as exports and imports as the share of GDP) positively associate with income inequality. Th is data indicates that more open economies in Africa tend to have high levels of income inequality. Part of the reason for this positive association could be that SSA countries in the middle-income category derive a signifi cant part of their GDP from trade in extractive industries. Th ese sectors, due to political economy factors, are characterized by high initial inequality (see also below). Th e question arises; does this mean that more openness can lead to a worsening of income inequality and higher incidence of poverty?
Th e answer depends on a number of factors. Th ere are cases where increased trade liberalization might be benefi cial to the poor. According to Winters, McCulloch and Mckay (2004) , the net gain to household welfare could be positive in circumstances where the majority of the population works in the trad- able sectors, such as in the production of exportable crops or in the formal manufacturing sectors that trade internationally. Th e entire issue is thus country and period specifi c.
Notwithstanding the complex relationship between growth and poverty, in particular where the eff ect of income distribution is considered, the aggregate available data for Africa in the 1990s shows that openness is negatively associated with the incidence of poverty. Th e relatively developed countries such as those in North Africa, South Africa, and Cote d'Ivoire had a high index of openness and a lower incidence of poverty (see Figure 5 ). Botswana, which is an outlier, did not seem to have less poverty even though it maintained a higher degree of openness. Th is case suggests the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the two variables. Th is outcome might be related to inequality which often arises (or increases) in highly open countries characterized by dependence in a single commodity; such as diamonds in Botswana. Bank (2000 Bank ( , 2001 . * National poverty line is used instead of US$1/day. ** P0= Head count ratio.
In another study, Cornia (1999) argues that falling equality in Africa over the past two decades cannot be attributed to the traditional causes such as land concentration and unequal access to education, but rather to the unregulated liberalization of domestic and international markets. His analysis points out that inequality between countries has been, in the past 15-20 years, followed by a surge in inequity within countries, including a few African economies. According to Cornia, the main source of the disparity in subSaharan Africa was the urban-rural gap. However, the process of 'equalization-downwards', with the impact of failed structural adjustment (liberalization) policies on urban income, has bridged that divide. Cornia also noted that intra-urban and intra-rural disparities have persisted as a result of policies that promote growth and exports in the midst of highly unequal distribution of assets. Given these fi ndings, it seems that the relationship of openness, growth and inequality remains undetermined. Inequality, in addition to income, shapes the relationship between openness and poverty. African inequality can be evaluated from two perspectives: (1) it can be appraised from a global viewpoint where Africa's position in the world distribution of wealth is considered (see Table 10 ); (2) the distribution of income and wealth can be examined within the African continent, comparing countries or groups within countries (see Table 11 ). Table 10 shows the striking divergence in the distribution of income across the world, despite fi fty years of rapid globalisation. Th e table highlights the fact that the poor are growing more destitute while the rich are becoming even better off . Africa's per capita income as a percentage of high income OECD countries declined from 3.3 per cent in 1980, to 2.1 per cent during 1991-1995. Th is decline continued to 2.0 per cent in the second half of the 1990s and to 1.9 per cent in 2001.
Th is widening income gap was actually common for most developing countries, except for countries in East Asia and the Pacifi c. Moreover, Wade (2003) has shown that Africa's share of the bottom quintile of the world distribution of income increased between 1990 and 1999. Th e continent of Africa is becoming worse off after opening its economy to international trade and fi nance. It is therefore important to examine whether openness in Africa, in particular international trade, is associated with persistent and rising inequality and poverty. Th is issue is discussed at length in the rest of this section.
Th e information contained in Table 11 is based on the best available data in Africa, and covers approximately 60 per cent of the continent's population (ECA, 1999) . It shows that Africa is characterized by a high degree of inequality, with a Gini coeffi cient of 44 per cent. Latin America had a Gini coeffi cient of 49 per cent. Th e high standard deviation refl ects the large variation in inequality among countries on the 1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996- Given these results, it is instructive to ask whether or not this pattern of inequality is associated with openness. Most cross-country regressions have found that openness, defi ned in diff erent ways, is positively correlated with income inequality (see Fischer, 2000; Easterly, 2002) .
Region
7 Again, as can be read from Figure 6 , the correlation between a measure of openness and income inequality is positive and signifi cant for selected African countries. Apart from the theoretical explanations for this evidence (such as the biased demand for skilled labour when developing countries liberalize their trade), there is also a political economy side to the story. Easterly (2002) argues that resource rich countries that depend primarily on a few products for their exports tend to have institutions and political frameworks that favour the persistence of income inequality. Th at is, more open economies in Africa tend to depend on one or two major export items (mineral, oil or primary commodity), and are characterized by high initial inequality. Such primary inequality could be sustained by trade liberalization.
Th e impact of the initial endowment diff erential on the distribution of income following liberalization is shown in Figure 7 . Using population density as a crude indicator of endowment intensity, Figure 7 shows a negative association between population density (low density showing initial inequality of resource ownership) and the Gini coeffi cient for a number of African countries in the 1990s. Th is outcome suggests that countries abundant in natural resources, such as land, tend to experience a rise in income inequality following trade liberalization. Th e explanation follows that countries rich in natural resources or land are both 7 Some disagree on the assertion that trade reform worsens income inequality on the grounds that the causation is weak (e.g. Srinivasan and Wallack, 2003) . Dollar and Kraay (2001) also takes the view that greater openness is neutral with respect to income distribution. capital and labour poor--factors represented by inequitable ownership in Africa (see Deininger and Olinto, 2000) . Both Figure 7 and the current cross-country evidence support these linkages between factor endowments and inequality.
Social Development, Equity and Inequality
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Social Development in Africa
SAPs have been the macroeconomic policy framework informing policy making in Africa since the 1980s. SAPs are based on the belief that the African economic and social crisis is primarily explained by policy failures that can be redressed with reform (World Bank, 1981 , 1989 , 1994a . Th e World Bank argued that the macroeconomic management strategies prescribed in SAPs represent the road to economic recovery for Africa, which means more, not less, adjustment is required (World Bank, 1994a) . Th is assertion has been the subject of a number of criticisms voiced by a diversity of actors in the international policy arena (see, inter alia, ECA, 1989; Adam, 1995; Mosley, Subasat and Weeks, 1995; Lall, 1995; White, 1996; Alemayehu, 2002) .
At the 1995 Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, a commitment was made to include social development goals in structural adjustment programs, paying particular attention to the eradication of poverty, the promotion of full and productive employment, and the enhancement of social integration. According to Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) , SAPs in Africa have made signifi cant progress on economic fundamentals, but poverty remains widespread and the institutional requirements for sustaining growth and extending its benefi ts more equitably among the population remain onerous (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; ECA, 1999) . Initially, there was an attempt to address the detrimental social impact of SAPs by ad hoc measures for the inclusion of 'social safety nets'. Th is however, has changed over time and the World Bank and IMF have more recently emphasized linking SAPs with poverty reduction through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Th is modifi cation is being strengthened with support for improved statistical and poverty monitoring capacity at the country level as well as with promises to ensure the participation (and Source: Bigsten and Shimeles (2003) . ownership) of local communities and civil society in the design and implementation of poverty reduction policies. Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) noted that when the situation of the SAP implementing countries was evaluated in-line with the objective of reducing poverty, poverty in SAP countries was comparable to the regional average, if not worse. In six of the thirteen countries for which data is available, more than 50 per cent of the population lived on less than one dollar a day. In some countries, like Zambia, the poverty head count ratio reached as high as 85 per cent. Poverty was also less severe in countries with no special assistance programs (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999) , pointing to the fact that the implementation of SAPs over the last two decades has been unsuccessful in achieving the goal of equitable social development, as outlined in the Copenhagen summit.
Th ere is also greater recognition, in Africa and among its development partners, of the eff ects of structural adjustment on social development and growth. Th e ECA study cited above shows that social stability in the African countries implementing adjustments accounted for a signifi cant diff erence in growth performance. Five countries with social instability grew at less than half the annual rate of those that maintained social stability. Moreover, over the past few years, the sector approach to addressing social development equity has evolved. It has been tried in about 25 programs and is replacing the traditional form of aid. About half of the identifi ed programs are in health and education with another nine in roads. Th is indicates an increasing emphasis on social sectors since the Copenhagen Summit. Unfortunately, poor management and slow resource disbursement at the implementation stage characterize most projects. Data for the fi rst year after the Social Summit show that the average public spending in African reforming countries declined from 3.5 per cent to 3.2 per cent of GDP (IMF, 1998; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Alemayehu, 2000) .
Th e evaluation of special assistance programs in adjusting African countries is diffi cult due to the paucity of data detailing how much public spending actually reaches the poor. Th is partly refl ects public mismanagement, but also points to the existence of external donors (as well as NGOs) that increasingly fund this sector, but whose accounts are not integrated into national databases. In summary, there is an increasing emphasis (since the Summit) to focus on social issues such as poverty, social sector promotion, education, and health, however, implementation problems are major bottlenecks in realizing these social objectives (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Alemayehu, 2000) .
Th e Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and social development in Africa 8
Th e PRSPs and realization of the MDGs are key elements of current public policy discourse in Africa. Th e PRSPs are essentially extensions of the SAPs and sponsored by the Bretton Woods Institutions. PRSPs suggest that there are opportunities to scale up participatory learning strategies from grassroots to national levels, while also off ering new possibilities to budget for these activities and increase public interest and participation in poverty monitoring (UNDP, 2002) . One of the problems of earlier strategies is that they failed to involve civil society and major stakeholders in policymaking. Instead, development policies were often formulated by government technocrats and decision makers, with the infl uence and help of donors. Th e PRSP initiative created, at least in principle, an opportunity for building a national consensus on the critical causes of poverty and social development inequity, as well as how to design appropriate interventions.
Th us, if appropriately implemented, the value added of the PRSP initiative may go beyond the economics of poverty reduction all the way to improving democratic culture and developing social capital.
In Africa, as elsewhere, participatory poverty data collection and policy work appear to be limited to and over-reliant on donor-funded exercises. Critical collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector does not occur, and consultations are not incorporated into the political activity of prioritising a range of policy options (UNDP, 2002; Weeks and others, 2003) . A recent study that evaluated the PRSP and Joint Staff Assessment documents of the World Bank for 19 African countries noted encouraging signs of progress towards comprehensive and participatory planning based on the recognition that poverty is multidimensional and has many roots. At the same time however, there is a tendency to ignore the social dimensions of anti-poverty strategies. Th e authors therefore concluded that there is scope for further international dialogue on the realistic expectations of PRSPs in terms of data, analytical rigour, and strategic detail. Th ere is also room for technical guidance in the preparation of PRSPs with the aim of incorporating social development goals (Th in, Underwood and Gilling, 2001 ).
MDGs are the centre of offi cial social discourse in Africa. It is hoped that these eight broad goals will be used as "a tool for awareness raising, advocacy, alliance building, and renewal of political commitments at the country level, as well as to build national capacity for monitoring and reporting on goals and targets" (Weeks and others, 2003) . Th e recent impetus for MDGs in Africa can be linked to the Copenhagen and the Millennium Declarations. Current studies about the MDGs generally cover the issue of achievability and resource requirements. On the other hand, key government policy documents in many parts of Africa use the MDG targets as desirable benchmarks even though the MDGs are not yet a coherent and central part of policy plans. Th is could be alleviated by streamlining the MDGs and PRSPs into the long-term plan and vision of African countries. Moreover, since many African countries remain in confl ict or post-confl ict situations, both the MDGs and the PRSPs need to take this issue on board to bring about a lasting solution for poverty and inequity. Similarly, major donor countries are using such targets as their guide for development assistance, but do not seem to address these latter issues (see Weeks and others, 2003; UNDP, 2002) . In addition to the country level harmonization of policies with MDG targets, regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have anchored their framework on MDG targets. Th us, the global as well as regional inertia behind the MDGs is increasingly forming a large part of the offi cial discourse on poverty, equity and interdependence. Th is is occurring even though the resources required to attain the MDGs are so signifi cant that they render achieving such targets unrealistic. Th is is further accentuated by the declining fl ow of offi cial development assistance to Africa in recent years and the rising debt burden in these countries. ECA (1999), for instance, forecasted the required GDP growth rate to halve poverty in Africa by 2015, to be about 7.2 per cent (or 4.2 per cent per capita).
Given the problems of domestic resource mobilization, the required level of external fi nancing is estimated at about 26 per cent of GDP. Th is is well above the current level of offi cial development assistance (ODA) to GDP ratio of about 12 per cent, which shows the diffi culty in achieving the MDGs in Africa (see ECA, 1999) . It is interesting to note that since the MDGs basically comprise social development goals, failure to achieve them is tantamount to regression in social development, equity and poverty reduction. Th e impacts of initial inequality on effi cient growth and poverty reduction need serious consideration. Figure 8 illustrates how the responsiveness of poverty to growth (elasticity of poverty to growth) varies with initial income inequality in SSA. Th e fi gure shows that countries with low levels of income inequality need a much lower rate of per capita income growth than those with high initial income inequality to reduce poverty by half by 2015.
From the discussion in the preceding sections, it is noted that initial inequality in Africa is strongly correlated with the degree of openness of the economy. Th at said, these countries need rapid and sustained growth in order to signifi cantly impact poverty. In fact, if countries can contain income inequality to its existing level, modest growth would be suffi cient to reduce poverty by half by 2015 (see Shimeles, 2004) . Th e issue therefore is that each country needs to consider how the interaction of trade reform and income inequality aff ects poverty. Th e contributions of trade reform to growth however, should not be the only guide used to design poverty reduction policies.
Conclusions
It has been more than a decade since world leaders committed themselves to bring about meaningful change in social development equity, inequality, and poverty at the Copenhagen Summit. An examination of the realization of these commitments shows that almost all African countries are very far from reaching their goals. Recently though, there has been a revitalization of economic fundamentals important to improving the social sectors. However, cautious optimism is required. Sustainable economic growth and development is precarious due to Africa's patterns of trade and fi nance, the prevalence of confl ict, dependence on agriculture (the main stay of the majority of the rural population), the vagaries of nature, backward technology, and dependence on the global commodity market.
International trade, fi nance, and aid link Africa to the world and in particular, developed countries. Th ese relationships are accentuated by the policy prescriptions of international fi nancial institutions (IFIs), which are in turn, complemented by global commitments like the MDGs and by African governments themselves. SAPs and PRSPs were intended in part, to speed up African engagement in global markets through a set of polices loosely termed 'liberalization'. Trade liberalization policies were critical instruments deployed in African countries during the SAP era, and trade remains the most signifi cant channel through which global interdependence impacts the welfare of ordinary African citizens. Justifi ably, there is a need for in-depth analysis of the patterns and implications of trade liberalization polices on social development, inequality, and poverty. Source: Bigsten and Shimeles (2005) .
Africa is eff ectively marginalized from global markets given its degree of trade and fi nancial integration with the rest of the world. Th e high growth and investment targets and hence, external fi nancing required to reduce poverty, makes this isolation a curse, especially in light of dwindling levels of domestic savings. Yet, its partition can also be considered a blessing because Africa has remained somewhat isolated from international fi nancial market instability.
From a policy perspective, Africa's integration into the global fi nancial system requires the institution of policies that promote investment fl ows to the continent, but also manage the extreme volatility and risks associated with such capital fl ows. Success in capital market liberalization in Africa requires, among other things, stronger fi nancial sector management and institutions and capacity building. It is also very important to confront the policy dilemma and trade-off s between high fl ows and high volatility. Given the huge cost of bailing out countries when they are faced with fi nancial crisis, Bhinda and others (1999) rightly noted that "Africa has no 'big brother' to facilitate a bailout in the fi rst place." Appropriate exchange rate policy, debt management, proper fi nancial regulation and supervision, and transparency are all necessary instruments for managing capital fl ows. Many of the preconditions for sustained fl ows of FDI to Africa rely on the structural transformation of African economies. Th is would have a positive eff ect on market size, resource discovery, and the conditions that enable high levels of growth.
In the face of the declining trend of ODA, aid eff ectiveness is an increasingly important policy tool, the development of which requires specifi c strategies for boosting capital effi ciency and transitioning from aid dependency in the medium to long run. Aid dependency has long-term detrimental eff ects on already weakened African institutions. Policymaking, thus, needs to insulate institutions through country and regional level capacity building strategies that go beyond economic management into issues of governance. Finally, addressing the trade related problems discussed at length in this paper will be a major step toward alleviating the continent's fi nancial problems.
Th e importance of the world economy to Africa, especially international trade, is signifi cant.
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However national governments are required to adjust to 'economic reality' and 'market discipline' in order to stimulate exports and promote foreign investment. Certain dangers are ignored, such as the 'race to the bottom', as individual countries try to bend their labour standards, environmental safeguards, and tax concessions to boost trade. Policymakers also ignore the 'fallacy of composition' inherent in the small-country assumption, causing the over-expansion of commodity supplies and declining prices.
Economic perception is as vitally important as economic reality. External economic relations need to be examined as a variable, rather than as a given. Domestic economic events become endogenous to the operation of the global system rather than simply at the behest of policymakers. Th is shows, on the one hand, how limited the options really are for domestic policymakers in Africa (especially if they act individually and only for short periods) and, on the other hand, the crucial importance of changing international arrangements, particularly trade and investment rules rather than aid. Th e global market remains extremely important to the African economy, especially given Africa's dependence on trade in a few commodities, the dominant eff ect of trade in the economy, and the secular deterioration and volatility of its terms of trade.
Africa's entrance into the global system has not been orderly, as can be read from its economic history, including the origins of its debt and external fi nance problems. As previously noted, debt issues stem from the structure of trade in general and from commodity trade in particular. Th e twin eff ects of low income and low price elasticities in developed country markets have led to declining terms of trade and high price volatility. Th e question then seems to be why Africa has not diversifi ed its exports to manufactures, services, or processed raw materials, all of which off er better growth prospects. One reason may be that such a switch requires capital (infrastructure and plant) and skills (or 'human capital') that Africa does not currently possess.
What lessons are relevant for shaping the future of economic growth and development in Africa? First, research amply confi rms that the debt problem is essentially a commodity problem (see Alemayehu, 2002) . Eff orts such as the HIPC process, which at least indicates a political commitment to act, will have little lasting eff ect unless export capacity and prices are raised. Second, if international fl ows of capital to Africa (such as aid) are envisaged, then more aid should be channelled towards small export farmers to promote exports and reduce poverty. Aid should also be accompanied by expansionary policies in order to keep exchange rates competitive. Th ird, Africa is highly vulnerable to changes in world interest rates and the subsequent activities of speculators because of their impact on commodity prices (the capital market eff ect of interest rates changes is not relevant). Th is implies that the construction of a new 'global fi nancial architecture' can only be undertaken at the international level. Fourth, fi scal defi cits are mostly exogenously determined by aid fl ows. Th is has important implications in terms of the need for donors to coordinate their actions in order to ensure macroeconomic sustainability, rather than leaving this task to IFIs alone (Alemayehu, 2002) .
Th ese various policy implications imply that the trade relations of Africa with developed countries need to be strengthened. Th e question then, is how? Improved access to developed country markets for processed primary commodities, and, in particular, the replacement of the Lomé system with better access to the European and American markets (along Everything but Arms of the EU and Th e African Growth and Opportunity Act of the US) would be a fi rst and important step. Commodity price stabilization schemes are currently out of favour and would require the full cooperation of the major importing transnational corporations in order to work at all. However, this is a problem of price volatility around the trend, as well as the declining trend itself. Reducing this volatility would benefi t both importers and exporters and thus should not be impossible to achieve through a properly administered buff er stock system. Th e market mechanism alone cannot produce this result since hedging ranges are so short, so this would have to be a form of public intervention. However, the long-term downward direction of the terms of trade is diffi cult. It would not matter so much if volume was increasing fast enough to raise the income terms of trade (as is happening with labour-intensive manufactures), but this is not, in fact, the case. Th e market for tropical commodities is oligopolistic and riddled with restrictive practices, e.g., sugar and cotton in the US and bananas and coff ee in Europe. Th erefore, a producers' cartel may be the only theoretically viable solution. However, in spite of the recent success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in driving up oil prices, Africa is unlikely to be able to organize such a cartel given the worldwide competition in those commodities.
Africa needs to change the mix (or at the very least upgrade the quality) of its primary export products in order to compete within the foreseeable future. Th is requires investment, in particular, joint ventures with foreign companies, investment by domestic investors, such as fi rms and households, and the reversal of capital fl ight. More than savings, risk is the main problem, since there is plenty of capital held overseas and also plenty of liquidity within the banking system. Th ese steps cannot be undertaken by each African country in isolation but rather, requires an international agreement on investment rules and stabilization of commodity prices; in other words, the orderly insertion of Africa into the global market.
Th is process, the orderly insertion of African in the global market, is not a smooth one, as illustrated by the outcome of liberalization policies and the enormous distributional consequences in the short to medium run. Th e impact of trade liberalization on household welfare varies considerably from country to country, and depending on the circumstances, it could improve social development or exacerbate existing poverty and inequality. Destitution and inequality are more likely to worsen in the presence of weak domestic industries and institutions, low degrees of inter-sectoral labour mobility, weak fi nancial institutions, frequent policy reversals, and the challenging market structure of the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Th us, the design and implementation of trade polices requires taking all of these issues into consideration.
Th e impact of trade liberalization on welfare depends to a certain degree on the state of income and poverty distribution in Africa. Existing income inequality is relatively high in most African countries, which makes the distributional consequence of trade policies a serious matter. Cross-country evidence shows the positive correlation between trade policies and income inequality through the channel of land abundance (e.g. Fischer, 2000) , and through political economy factors for Africa (e.g. Easterly, 2002) . In some cases, trade liberalization could also worsen income distribution by reducing the demand for unskilled labour. A related issue is the impact of trade reform on intra-household inequality and gender disparity. Even if the aggregate welfare of a household increases, it is possible for some measures of trade reform to increase intrahousehold inequality through changes in employment opportunities between male and female household members (Winters, 2000) as well as through changes in the composition of the whole workforce (UNDP, 2003) . Sectors such as textiles may rapidly expand in the wake of trade liberalization, which in Africa, are mostly female-intensive (Blackden, 2003) . Depending on the relative wages in these sectors, overall inequality tends to rise even if more women are employed in the economy.
Th e positive eff ects of trade liberalization can be enhanced if policymakers act at the right time (Winters, 2000) , and institute basic macroeconomic stability policies (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002) . For instance, infl ationary trade policy measures can be controlled with appropriate macro-stabilization policies. Th ese stabilization policies though, in most cases hurt the poor. Th us, it is important to decide the appropriate timing of the trade reform in order to maximize gains and minimize the adverse eff ects on the least well-off .
Integrating poverty diagnostics with trade policies can minimize the negative eff ects. Poverty mapping assists in development of trade reforms that benefi t the poor or minimize their welfare loss. Poverty decomposition along sectoral lines also provides analytical tools to evaluate who benefi ts from trade liberalization, thus helping policymakers devise the most appropriate and eff ective intervention strategies on behalf of the poor (Kanbur, 2000) .
Finally, ownership of policies, such as PRSPs, is crucial. In order to realize the ideals of the Social Summit, strategies must be designed in a way that ensures the sustainability of recent gains in the macroeconomic sphere and their integration with social objectives. Th is will take the form of:
Ensuring political stability and designing peaceful mechanisms of confl ict resolution Pursuing macroeconomic stability by emphasizing the savings-investment-export nexus, and policy ownership Investing in human capital formation and institution building Addressing each country's major structural problems such as diversifi cation and dependency Progress on each of these fronts is a way to bring about social development equity, poverty reduction, and equality. Th e international community can and should play a signifi cant role in attaining these important objectives.
• • • • Annex 1b. Export share of total exports of three principal commodities in SSA countries Countries 1970 Countries 1990 Countries -1992 Countries 1997 Countries -1999 
